Order-preserving encryption (OPE) produces ciphertexts that preserve the relative order of the underlying plaintexts. Thus, it is very suitable for range queries over encrypted outsourced data, as it is a popular case in cloud database scenarios. Unfortunately, most schemes suffer from infeasibility in practice due to requirements like hardly maintainable data structures or additional architectural components. While OPE is a widely discussed topic in theory, to our knowledge only one OPE scheme received noticeable practical attention ((Boldyreva et al., 2009) for SQL-based systems in (Popa et al., 2011; Tu et al., 2013) ). Therefore, our work identifies the practical requirements for utilizing OPE in real world usage with focus on existing NoSQL cloud database technologies. We evaluate a variety of popular schemes and propose improvements for two of them in order to further improve their practicability. Then we assess the performance of our modifications in comparison to the approach of (Boldyreva et al., 2011) (which can be considered the successor of (Boldyreva et al., 2009 ) by a runtime analysis in combination with two popular NoSQL wide column store databases.
INTRODUCTION
In Big Data applications large amounts of information are processed by database systems. In particular, modern web services have a high demand for availability, consistency, partition tolerance, performance, and scalability, that are at best difficult and expensive to achieve with traditional relational databases. NoSQL databases, especially the subcategory of wide column stores (WCSs), were designed to meet those requirements. They run in distributed cloud environments as key technology behind many popular platforms, e.g. Apache HBase behind Facebook (Borthakur et al., 2011) , Apache Cassandra behind eBay or Google's BigTable behind almost every Google service (Chang et al., 2008) . Due to the increased amount of data being produced every day (e.g. in social media platforms as well as by business or research), these databases are often outsourced to remote and potentially untrusted servers. Unfortunately security was not a primary concern of their designers (Okman et al., 2011) .
Encryption is a tool to protect data confidentiality in such untrustworthy environments, but it also limits the options for interacting with the data that was encrypted. Using traditional encryption methods like AES or RSA is unfeasible, because they do not preserve the plaintext properties, that WCSs rely on (see section 2.2). Since a very common task in cloud database systems is executing range queries to select rows with consecutive row IDs, we focus on orderpreserving encryption (OPE). It preserves the order of the row IDs and thereby allows range queries to be executed on the encrypted data as on plaintext data.
Although OPE is an active field of research, the practical feasibility of most schemes is insufficient. Thus, our work makes the following contributions:
• It identifies the requirements for utilizing OPE in NoSQL WCSs.
• Based on those criteria it evaluates the practical feasibility of popular OPE schemes and proposes modifications for two of them to improve it.
• It conducts a practical performance comparison of the two proposed modifications and the popular approach of (Boldyreva et al., 2011 ) based on our own implementations using the currently most popular NoSQL WCSs 1 Apache Cassandra (Lakshman and Malik, 2010) and Apache HBase (Borthakur et al., 2011) as underlying platforms.
BACKGROUND 2.1 Order Preserving Encryption
Formally speaking, an order-preserving (symmetric) encryption scheme with plaintext space D (domain) and ciphertext space R (range) is a tuple of algorithms (KGen, Enc, Dec) satisfying the following conditions:
• The key-generation algorithm KGen outputs a random key k.
• The encryption algorithm Enc uses k and a plaintext p to output the ciphertext c = Enc k (p).
• The decryption algorithm Dec uses k and a ciphertext c to output the plaintext p. Thus it holds:
• The order relation of plaintexts is preserved, i.e. Agrawal et al., 2004) were the first to introduce the notation of OPE and proposed a theoretical scheme to address it. In database applications OPE is a very powerful primitive, because it allows the database system to make comparisons between the ciphertexts that result in the same outcomes as if it had operated on the corresponding plaintexts. Thus, the database can still build efficient indexes on the encrypted input for answering range queries quickly in the same way as on plaintext data. Unfortunately most OPE approaches define their own security notion (see Table 1 ), which makes a comparison of their security levels rather difficult. However, as the scope of this paper is practical feasibility of OPE rather than security, we refer the reader in particular to the work of (Boldyreva et al., 2009; Boldyreva et al., 2011) who did the first mathematical groundwork in proofing OPE security.
Wide Column Stores
As surveyed for example in (Harrison, 2015) different WCSs follow different principles in terms of architecture, querying, data types, node coordination, etc. Despite this diversity they all use a similar data model, which can be roughly described as follows.
WCSs can formally be considered sparse, distributed, multidimensional maps of the form (table, rowkey, column,timestamp) → value, formally described in detail in (Chang et al., 2008) .
The concept of tables, rows and columns is used like in traditional relational (SQL-based) databases. However, the main difference is that columns are created for each row instead of being predefined by the table structure. Every row has an identifier that has to be unique for the table (commonly referred to as "row key"). Data is maintained in lexicographic order by that key. As WCSs are distributed systems, ranges of such row keys serve as units of distribution. Hence similar row keys (and thus data items that are likely to be semantically related to each other) are always kept physically close together, in the best case on neighboring sectors of a disk, but at least on the same node of a cluster. Thus, reads of ranges require only communication of a minimal number of machines.
FEASIBILITY OF OPE IN WCS

Criteria
Due to the general working principles of WCSs described in the previous section, OPE schemes have to satisfy certain requirements. Hence we evaluate their practical feasibility in WCS database scenarios based on five criteria:
(I) Ciphertext (im-)mutability. The ciphertext produced by an OPE scheme is called mutable, if it may change as more and more input gets encrypted. An example of this category is (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) , described in section 3.2.2. OPE schemes producing immutable ciphertexts avoid the re-encryption overhead in the first place. Immutable means once a plaintext is encrypted, the corresponding ciphertext is final. An instance of this category is (Wozniak et al., 2013) , described in section 3.2.1.
As discussed in section 2.2 an encryption of the row keys should be order-preserving to preserve the order of the rows and thus the way data gets distributed in the cluster. The usage of a mutable OPE for the row keys would cause row keys to change over time and hence would result in changing the data's physical position inside the database (cluster), which is prohibitively expensive (and thus, generally not supported by WCS databases). However, mutable OPE schemes should be used for the column data itself to gain more performance, as can be observed in section 4. Note that ciphertext mutability is often strongly related to criterion II and V.
(II) Need for Additional Data Structures. If they are not stateless OPE schemes require additional data structures for storing at least their plaintextciphertext-mappings. That can be done using indexes, trees, dictionaries etc., either on clientside (or at least a trusted enviroment), e.g. (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) , or on serverside, e.g. (Popa et al., 2013; Roche et al., 2015) . Note that in particular maintaining tree structures is usually expensive for (non-graph-based) database systems. Hence, sometimes additional components on serverside are proposed for performance reasons (see criterion III), which makes practical implementations rather complex.
(III) Need for Additional Architectural Components. Client applications and database platforms normally do not have built-in mechanisms for OPE. Thus additional components are required for both rewriting queries to make them work with the serverside data structures (as they might have to be altered for functioning with the OPE schemes) as well as for performing decryption and encryption itself. Usually those components have to reside in the trusted (clientside) environment (e.g. (Popa et al., 2011; Tu et al., 2013) ). However some OPE schemes even require components running co-located to the database server (e.g. (Popa et al., 2013) ), which cannot be considered practical due to the architectural overhead. In particular database-as-a-service providers usually do not support that.
(IV) Input Capabilities. The authors of all OPE proposals that we have encountered assume only positive integer input for their schemes. This is hard to apply to real world datasets in which we also find negative or floating point numbers. One option to deal with negative input would be adding an offset value to the plaintext space, that is large enough to push every value above zero. The question is how to determine this offset, when the entire plaintext space is not known in advance. Handling floating point data is an even bigger problem. To our knowledge there is no technique converting floating point numbers to integers in an order-preserving way without loss of precision. This rises the question whether existing OPE schemes can be modified to also work with negative and/or floating point input. We will answer that for the schemes we have investigated in section 3.2. However, independent from the input type, some OPE schemes further require detailed knowledge of all the plaintexts before encryption (e.g. (Liu and Wang, 2012) ), which is hard to realize in practical scenarios as databases may grow unpredictably over time. Some schemes even need to encrypt the whole plaintext space D in advance (Wozniak et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014) , instead of encrypting only the desired values on demand. The unfeasibility of such an approach can be illustrated easily using the following example: let D be defined by a common Integer datatype. Having a typical length of 32 bit, |D| would be of size 2 32 , which means 4.3 billion items would have to be pre-computed and stored (even if the majority is never used).
(V) Security. The first formal security analysis of OPE (Boldyreva et al., 2009 ) proved that ideal security 2 with immutable ciphertexts can only be accomplished, if the ciphertext space size |R| is exponential in the plaintext space size |D|, which is hard to achieve in practice. OPE schemes deal with this problem in different ways (which often has a direct impact on the criteria II and III). Examples are modular plaintext shifting (Boldyreva et al., 2011 ) (easy to implement, but only a small security enhancement) or using fake queries to hide the query distribution (Mavroforakis et al., 2015) (causing communication and computation overhead). In practice ideal security can be achieved more easily by OPE schemes producing mutable ciphertexts, because they do not have the requirement of a ciphertext space size being exponential in the plaintext space size. They also hide the frequency distribution of plaintext-ciphertext assignments much better, being able to achieve an almost uniform distribution (as shown e.g. by (Wozniak et al., 2013) ). Still, that also means dealing with unavoidable re-encryptions of (at least parts of) the ciphertext, that is already stored in the database. Recent schemes try to keep the number of such updates to a minimum (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) or take the burden of reassigning ciphertexts to components on serverside (Popa et al., 2013) to reduce at least communication costs. An alternative approach to avoid re-encryption in the first place is pre-encrypting as discussed in criterion IV. (Naveed et al., 2015) proposed two attacks on OPE-encrypted databases. Their attacks either require the cipherspace to be small compared to the number of encrypted values (e.g. the largest cipherspace they consider has a size of 365 while the tables contain at least a few hundred rows) or the plaintexts to deviate strongly from a uniform distribution. If OPE is applied on reasonably chosen columns, i.e. where the number of ciphertexts is at least an order of magnitude smaller than the size of the cipherspace and where the corresponding plaintexts are uniformly distributed, OPE still provides a good level of security.
Selection of Practically Feasible OPE Schemes
For a quick overview and brief evaluation of the schemes that we investigated based on the criteria introduced in section 3.1, see Table 1 . We selected the most promising three for implementation and testing in real world WCSs. Detailed explanations of these schemes and our modifications to improve the practical feasibility of two of them are given in the chapters 3.2.3 -3.2.2. For not losing scope of this paper we do not explain the concepts of the schemes that we ruled out. However to give an idea of why we consider those OPE schemes impractical, we point out a few of their characteristics that cannot be read from this table.
The approaches of (Kadhem et al., 2010) and (Liu et al., 2014) require splitting and partitioning of the plaintext space. Hence, they have to keep track of more metadata than most other schemes. The scheme of (Liu and Wang, 2012) requires detailed knowledge of the plaintext space. In particular it needs to know the smallest distance between two input values for adding random noise to the ciphertexts in a way that does not corrupt the original order. Again, in practice we usually do not have this detailed information about the plaintext in advance. Furthermore, this is a tricky problem when encrypting floating point numbers, since in theory the minimum distance between such numbers can be arbitrarily small. As mentioned before the approach of (Popa et al., 2013) needs an additional component running co-located to the database server, which they call "OPE-server". It is responsible for performing re-encryption operations as described in section 3.1-I. In real world scenarios running additional applications on the same platform as or co-located to the database server often is not possible. The approach of (calling it order-revealing encryption) completely lacks a decryption functionality. Instead it comes with a custom compare operator. Thus it is not applicable for a database scenario, since it surely would preserve the order of the plaintext, but their exact values would not be recoverable.
In the following sections, we will give a brief introduction for each of the selected OPE schemes, identify their practical weaknesses and describe our modifications in order to overcome them as far as possible. (Wozniak et al., 2013) Description. The authors introduce three OPE schemes, namely random offset addition (ROA), random uniform sampling (RUS) and random subrange selection (RSS). Since ROA is somewhat trivial and an attacker only needs to know a single plaintextciphertext-pair to break the encryption, we focus on RSS with RUS being a sub-procedure of it. RSS can roughly be described as follows. First of all, randomly decide how to draw the lower and upper bounds r min and r max of the range R, either by choosing r min ∈ [1, |R| − |D| + 1] and r max ∈ [r min + |D| − 1, |R|] or by choosing r max ∈ [|D|, |R|] and r min ∈ [1, r max − |D| + 1]. Afterwards an order-preserving function (OPF) from D = [1, |D|] to R = [1, r max − r min + 1] is sampled using an alternative OPE construction scheme. We use the authors' RUS as described in the next paragraph. Finally add r min − 1 to all ciphertexts.
RUS gets initialized with an empty OPF f and the minimum and maximum elements of D and R as specified by RRS before. A recursive sample procedure then randomly selects an element p ∈ [d min , d max ] and c ∈ [r min + p − d min , r max + p − d max ]. Thus, p splits D in a lower and a higher sub-domain and c splits R in a lower and a higher sub-range. The pair (p, c) is added to f and the sample procedure continues recursively as before with the new sub-domains and sub-ranges until D is completely covered.
Weaknesses. RSS with RUS has mainly two practical disadvantages. Firstly, it can handle only positive numerical inputs. Secondly, it processes the whole domain D instead of computing and returning only the ciphertexts for actually desired plaintexts on demand (an example illustrating the impracticability of this approach was given in section 3.1-IV). Our Modifications. We can get rid of the first weakness trivially by initializing the sample function in RUS with a negative value for d min instead of 1. This extends the domain D into the range of negative numbers (as far as we want). Since the algorithm only works with random selections in intervals and some additions and subtractions, that does not affect its working principle. We can eliminate the second weakness by modifying RRS and RUS in the following way.
First of all, we define p specifying the plaintext value that we are actually aiming for in the encryption process (instead of the whole domain D). We modify the sample procedure of RUS by adding an extra parameter for p . Now instead of always continuing recursively after a split for the lower subdomain Then we modify RSS itself. Instead of always starting with the full domain |D| (which in combination with our RUS sample function modification would result in an inconsistent encryption anyway), we now initialize the sample function of RUS only with the sub-domain [d 1 , d 2 ], in which d 1 is the highest already encrypted value smaller than p and d 2 is the smallest already encrypted value greater than p . As more and more values get encrypted, this reduces the average number of samplings further (see Figure  1) . In order to make that work for the first p that we would like to encrypt after we have determined r min and r max in the initialization phase of RSS, we add the minimum and maximum pairs (p min , c min ) and (p max , c max ) to f by sampling c min from [r min , r max −1] and c max from [c min + 1, r max ]. the improvements by showing the average number of necessary samplings for computing the ciphertexts of 10000 uniformly and randomly generated 32 bit Integer plaintext values 20 times. Instead of always having to sample |D| = 2 32 = 4294967296 times to cover the whole domain and then pick the 10000 (p, c) pairs that we actually wanted, we only need 186.287 samplings (= 0.004%) for those 10000 values on average. Note that our implentation (for details see section 4) is able to do this in less than a second. Of course this number gets lower, if less values are supposed to be encrypted (see Figure 1) . Furthermore it can be observed, that as more and more values have already been encrypted, the average number of necessary samplings required per value decreases from the expected log 2 (|R|) = log 2 (2 32 ) = 32 for the first encryption to 21 for the 10000th encryption (see Figure  2 ).
Optimal Average-complexity
Ideal-security OPE by (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) Description. The OPE scheme introduced in (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) can be briefly described as follows. The OPF f is initialized with two plaintext-ciphertext-pairs, namely (−1, −1) and (|D|, |R|). New pairs (p, c) are always inserted between (p n , c n ) and (p n+1 , c n+1 ) with p n ≤ p < p n+1 and c = c n + c n+1 −c n 2
. If p = p n , the value was already encrypted. If c n+1 − c n = 1 there is no gap large enough to accommodate the new ciphertext c. In this case a re-encryption procedure is executed: From all the sorted and distinct plaintexts p 1 ...p m that have already been encrypted, start over like described above with p = p m 2 +1 and continue recursively with the interval p 1 ... Practical Weaknesses. This scheme comes with a couple of weaknesses. The most obvious one is its re-encryption phase, because in practice that means reading all already encrypted values from the database, re-encrypt them and finally write them back into the database. In order to keep the occurrences of those re-encryptions as rare as possible, the ciphertext space should be chosen large enough. Having a plaintext space of length n bit the authors recommend a ciphertext space of size λn bits, with a theoretical safe upper bound of λ = 6.31107, but they also show in their practical experiments that λ = 3 (sometimes even λ = 2) is already sufficient for most datasets. Another practical weakness of this scheme is the fact, that the insertion order matters. The best case is when all elements of a perfectly balanced binary search tree are inserted in pre-order traversal order. The average case is a uniform input distribution. The worst case is inserting pre-sorted values, which should be avoided at all (see section 4). Last but not least the scheme cannot handle negative input by the authors' definition. Even though this scheme comes with all these practical weaknesses, we chose it because it works with very simple computations, that do not even involve randomness. Thus it is very promising in terms of speed.
Our Modifications. Since we cannot avoid the reencrytion phase other than by defining the range large enough and we also might not have any influence on the insertion order of the plaintexts later on, the only modification we can apply is initializing f with (−|D|, −|R|) and (|D|, |D| λ ), instead of (−1, −1) and (|D|, |R|). Similar to our modification for (Wozniak et al., 2013) this extends the domain to also cover negative input. To make sure this does not increase the number of necessary re-balancings, we adjusted the ciphertext space as recommended by the authors.
3.2.3 mOPE by (Boldyreva et al., 2011) Description. mOPE is an extension of (Boldyreva et al., 2009) . It is based on the fact that any orderpreserving function from {1...M} to {1...N} can be represented by a combination of M out of N ordered items. Thus, ciphertexts can be computed by sampling values according to the hypergeometric distribution. mOPE adds a secret modular shift to the encryption in the following way: if DEC OPE and ENC OPE are the decryption and encryption function of the standard Boldyreva OPE (Boldyreva et al., 2009) , then ENC mOPE (x) = ENC(x + m) (where m is a secret offset) and DEC mOPE (x) = DEC OPE (x) − m mod |D| (where |D| is the size of the plaintext space).
Practical Weaknesses. The core element of this algorithm is sampling from the hypergeometric distribution, which is computationally expensive and requires the input to be a positive Integer. However, we still consider (Boldyreva et al., 2011) to be an interesting candidate for practical usage because to our knowledge, it is the only OPE scheme that does not require maintaining a state. That makes it easy to implement the algorithm for client server scenarios. Furthermore, since to our knowledge its predecessor (Boldyreva et al., 2009 ) is the only OPE scheme of practical relevance so far (implemented in (Popa et al., 2011; Tu et al., 2013) ), it is interesting to compare it to the other OPE schemes.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
Since disk access and memory management in WCSs are performed at column family level, we implemented the indexes of (Wozniak et al., 2013; Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) in the same way. For our experiments we inserted up to 20000 uniformly distributed and randomly created 32-bit Integer values into Cassandra and HBase using the three OPE schemes as described in section 3.2.1 -3.2.3. While for (Boldyreva et al., 2011; Wozniak et al., 2013 ) the order of insertion does not matter, for (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) we tested the three cases as described in section 3.2.2. We used local installations to avoid network effects, as we wanted to measure the computation time of the schemes in combination with the insertion speed of the databases. All implementations were done in Java 8. We ran our experiments on an Intel Core i7-4600U CPU @ 2.10GHz, 8GB RAM, a Samsung PM851 256GB SSD using Ubuntu 15.04. Figure 3 and 4 present the results, showing the average of ten measurements. Even though they have an index to maintain the approaches of (Wozniak et al., 2013; Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) are generally faster than the stateless scheme of (Boldyreva et al., 2011) . The only exception is using (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) with pre-sorted input, which is prohibitively slow and should be avoided. The best combination of OPE scheme and WCS is (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) in its best and average case with Cassandra, where the encryption step causes a performance loss of only 3%.
Cassandra is generally ca. 40% faster than HBase, mainly because (Wozniak et al., 2013; Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) are so fast that the database system's mere insertion time requires a significant share in the overall process of encrypting and inserting. With Cassandra being optimized for writes it takes advantage of this. An exception is the worst case usage of (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) , where because of the re-balancing phases not only writing but also reading performance matters. In this case HBase is always 12-15% faster than Cassandra, which seems to reflect the fact, that while Cassandra is optimized for writes, HBase is optimized for reads.
Because decrypting is very simple, we do not elaborate on it in the same level of detail as we did for encrypting. In (Wozniak et al., 2013) and (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) it is just a lookup in the index which takes less than 1 ms. (Boldyreva et al., 2011 ) is computational more expensive, since it has no index to use. Hence it requires up to 5 ms for decryption.
DISCUSSION
The results show that OPE can be used in WCSs efficiently. However, when choosing an OPE scheme it makes sense to think about the future use of the database. If speed matters and there is a low probability of pre-sorted inputs, the scheme of (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) is advisable. If an index should be avoided and ciphertexts are required to be immutable (Boldyreva et al., 2011) is the way to go. (Wozniak et al., 2013 ) is a compromise between both. It delivers immutable ciphertext almost as fast as (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) for every input, but it requires an index.
Of course in the practical application a combination of the different OPE schemes is most promising. Row keys should be encrypted with the OPE of (Boldyreva et al., 2011) or (Wozniak et al., 2013) Regular, unordered columns can be encrypted with the scheme of (Kerschbaum and Schröpfer, 2014) . For regular columns with ordered data the algorithm of (Wozniak et al., 2013) is the best choice.
RELATED WORK
So far there is not much work using OPE with real world technologies besides the work that we already mentioned throughout the paper. The most popular example surely is "CryptDB" (Popa et al., 2011) utilizing the immutable scheme of (Boldyreva et al., 2009) , tweaked by operating with a binary search tree and caching in the background. Another system for executing queries over encrypted data is "Monomi" (Tu et al., 2013) , also using (Boldyreva et al., 2009) for OPE. Both approaches are designed for working with SQL-based systems.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We discussed how OPE can be used in NoSQL WCSs and quantified the performance of three OPE schemes on the two currently most popular platforms. Since we have already done the same for a couple of schemes for searchable encryption (Waage et al., 2015) , our next goal is to build a seamless integrating proxy client similar to "CryptDB" for executing more sophisticated queries on encrypted WCS databases. Furthermore we plan support for Apache Accumulo.
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